

# SWP

# discussion bulletin

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## ON THE REVOLUTIONARY PARTY

By Tim Wohlforth

Without the party, independently of the party, skipping over the party, through a substitute for the party, the proletarian revolution can never triumph. . . . We have paid too dearly for this conclusion as to the role and significance of the party for the proletarian revolution to renounce it so lightly or even to have it weakened. -- Leon Trotsky, Lessons of October, as quoted in Third International After Lenin, p. 124, emphasis in original.

Perhaps of all conceptions of our movement the most crucial is that of the revolutionary party. It is this concept of an organized Marxist vanguard of the working class which distinguishes us, as it did the Bolsheviks, of Lenin's time, from all varieties of centrism. Any attempt to dull the vanguard's Marxist consciousness, to soften its granite hardness, to bend its revolutionary program, must be countered with all one's might. Here we are dealing with the heart of our whole program and organization. Even the slightest sickness in the heart immediately endangers the whole body.

Joe Hansen is correct in emphasizing in his plenum presentation that the revolutionary party is a world party. It extends, at least theoretically, to every country, to every inch of the surface of this globe. A retreat from the concept of and need for a vanguard party in any single country of the world brings into question the world party itself and therefore impinges on the independence of one's own party. This will become clearer as we go along.

Perhaps the most significant fact about the theoretical position of the majority on the Cuba question is that Hansen's "Theses" passed so overwhelmingly at the last plenum does not contain a single mention of the need for a revolutionary party in Cuba. This confirms that the "Theses" is a fitting and accurate theoretical codification of the line towards the Cuban revolution taken by the party and by the party press. This has been a political line not only of defense of the Cuban revolution, but of complete and uncritical support to the Castro leadership of the Cuban revolution. With such a political attitude it goes without saying that the creation of a revolutionary Marxist party in Cuba is not only unnecessary but a diversionary action (Comrade Deck seems to suggest that it might even be considered counterrevolutionary).

If things had been left at this point one would at least say that the party majority has put forth a consistent theory which is an honest summing up of the political line the party has been actually following. However, perhaps under the pressure of the criticisms raised by the minority, perhaps for other considerations, the majority comrades feel that such a position is too glaringly at variance with the traditional views of our movement and therefore at the plenum the comrades made an effort to add to their theoretical outlook the concept of the revolutionary party without, however, changing the political line of the "Theses" or of the party press. Since the political line of uncritical support makes the creation of a revolutionary party quite superfluous, all the comrades succeeded in doing at the plenum is to damage the very concept of the revolu-

tionary party itself. Therefore rather than making a bad theory better they ended up making it worse and bringing into question the essential concepts of our movement.

For example, during the discussion, Comrade Murry Weiss stated: "Since the question of the role of the party has arisen in the discussion of the Theses here, I think it should be underscored that from beginning to end the whole aim of the Theses is to introduce into the Cuban revolution precisely the question of the party." Rather than answering anything this formulation simply raises an intriguing question: Just what is Murry's concept of the party which is expressed so completely in a document which does not even mention the party?

### The Crusade Against Narrowness

Let us see, as clearly as we can when dealing with such vaguely expressed ideas, exactly what is the concept of the revolutionary party the majority comrades have evolved? Comrade Hansen, in his original presentation, warns against "narrowness" in conceiving of the revolutionary party. "I'm afraid," he states, "that sometimes we tend to look at the SWP as it is -- that's what we mean by a party, a revolutionary party." Elsewhere he comments: "But we're left with the question how are we to explain this victory in Cuba in the absence of a party like the Socialist Workers Party. . . . Isn't there a great danger in this? . . . Now I will admit that there is a danger here. A danger that some comrades can reach such a conclusion."

He attacks this "narrowness" with two arguments: first he states that the revolutionary party we have in mind is a mass revolutionary party and thus different from the SWP today, and second it is not a narrow national party but a world party. These concepts were echoed by others in the course of the floor discussion. Of course, on the surface, Joe is quite correct -- so correct that it appears in fact that he is beating a dead horse. However, when one looks a little closer at these ideas, looking at them within the context of the political line these comrades have been following, a "Theses" which does not mention the party, and in counterposition to the views of the minority, things look a bit different.

Comrade Hansen is right in attacking a conception that the task of building revolutionary parties is a task of creating exact replicas of the SWP in other lands. This truly would be a sign that the comrades putting forth this view were guilty of narrow provincialism. We envision the revolutionary party taking many concrete forms -- in one country it may be a small open party primarily engaged in propaganda work like the SWP; in another country it may be carrying out an entry tactic within a mass workers party as well as independent activity in the unions as is the case with the SLL; or it may exist only as an idea within the head of a single individual as it did for so many years in Japan, or the other extreme, it may take on the mass character necessary for its coming to power, as was the case of the Bolshevik party which still remains our main model. Whatever its form, its essence is always the same. On this latter point we do confess to a certain "narrowness" -- we view

that essence today as orthodox Trotskyism. We feel there is no other revolutionary Marxist current and there can be no other revolutionary Marxist party but an orthodox Trotskyist party.

Thus when Joe Hansen queries as to whether there is a "danger" in a victory of the socialist revolution in Cuba "in the absence of a party like the Socialist Workers Party" we can answer clearly -- yes, we see a danger to our fundamental concepts if one means by "a party like the Socialist Workers Party" an orthodox Trotskyist party, whatever its name may be. Yes, we admit to "narrowness" on this point.

During the floor discussion Harry Ring, who describes himself as "a very enthusiastic supporter" of regroupment (no one will challenge him on this), warns against those mythological party sectarians who "have developed consciously and unconsciously, an extremely mechanical, dogmatic and sterile conception of how our Trotskyist movement was going to emerge here and elsewhere as the mass movement that would establish workers power: that is, that we would recruit one at a time, as we're doing now, and then at a certain point there would be a change in the historic juncture and great masses would come to recognize that we had been right all along, that we would have to get a wider doorway downstairs so they could all come pouring in." Again we cannot but agree with Comrade Ring's attacks on a "narrowness" which ignores possibilities of entries and fusions of one kind or other. But one gets a feeling from the way this correct idea is put that the comrades may be getting impatient -- may be seeking "get rich quick" schemes. While we do not allow fetishism to prevent us from achieving the essence of a mass Trotskyist movement it is again an orthodox Trotskyist movement we are going to build as only such a movement can lead the successful socialist revolution. Again we confess at least in part to "narrowness" in that we feel there will come a time in history when "great masses would come to recognize that we had been right all along" -- that the mass of the working class will look to the orthodox Trotskyists for leadership. (We will, I hope, have moved out of 116 long since, so that the size of the door will not be our problem!)

This question of "narrowness" becomes even clearer when we get to Comrade Hansen's summary: "But our tendency has been -- I mean the tendency of many comrades -- is to take a narrow, organizational view as to how to organize the party." He then polemicizes against some comrades who could not overcome this "narrowness" of our party, and tried to recruit some Cubans "so they can organize a party down there just like ours." Joe goes on: "You see, they already have their own movement. . . . That's the reason why, in the Militant and in this document, there is a certain abstractness (emphasis T.W.) to what we say about the party."

The difference between the majority and minority on the question of the party becomes crystal clear in this statement. The majority does not seek to build a Trotskyist party in Cuba -- this would be taking "a narrow, organizational view" -- for the very simple reason that they feel that the 26th of July Movement is good enough and we don't need another one. We of the minority take a "narrow, organizational view" of the party in the sense that we

feel the Castro regime is inadequate to the tasks of carrying through the socialist revolution in Cuba and spreading it throughout the world. We seek to create a Trotskyist movement in Cuba to supplant the present petty-bourgeois leadership with a true working-class leadership.

### A World Party and a Revolutionary Consciousness that Floats

In raising the question of the world party Comrade Hansen is beating an even dead horse (pardon the biological license) than in his polemic against "narrowness." However, there is a danger here in the completely abstract way in which Joe conceives of this international movement. We view the international party as being created precisely through the formation of solid Trotskyist parties in the various countries of the world -- parties based on an internationalist outlook and functioning as sections of a democratic centralist world party. It was this concept which our movement developed against Pablo to whom the International was a floating body of footloose intellectuals who issue manifestoes and magazines in numerous languages.

Comrade Hansen seems to introduce once again into our party a concept of the world party as an abstraction much like Pablo's. However, he does this for different political motives. He seeks to cover a line which neglects the building of a Trotskyist party in the concrete in Cuba (and by inference in other lands) by talking of building an abstracted world party. He gives the impression that such a world body might or might not take concrete form in this country or that country. We continue to maintain that the way to build the world movement is to build solid Trotskyist cadres in all countries.

Another quite related abstract concept was introduced during the plenum by the majority comrades -- the concept of a floating consciousness which is unrelated to the concrete formation of a conscious revolutionary vanguard. Comrade Hansen states in his original presentation: "What are the perspectives for the development of revolutionary consciousness -- revolutionary socialist consciousness in Cuba? The fact is that the consciousness is beginning to appear in Cuba." He then goes on to cite recent Cuban magazine and newspaper articles which discuss socialism and Marxism. (It is interesting to note, in passing, that Joe finds socialist consciousness "beginning to appear" in Cuba some months after it had become, according to him, a workers state.) Comrade Stevens gives two criteria for calling Cuba a workers state: "The social base and the property form, consciousness of the goal of socialism." He proves the existence of the latter in Cuba in the same way Joe does. Harry Ring refers to the "revolutionary consciousness" in Cuba and gives it quite a lot of weight in his analysis of Cuba. Comrade Stein sees this abstract consciousness as being "moulded in the struggle and in the course of the revolution."

The concept of consciousness is extremely important for it is the process of the working class becoming conscious of its own real interests, which is the precondition for the working class becoming the ruling class. It is therefore important to note both the general

level of socialist consciousness of the masses and the organizational form this consciousness takes. We must guard against any conceptions which substitute this general consciousness for the process of creating organized consciousness. While Comrade Hansen asserts elsewhere in his presentation: ". . . the need for Marxist political consciousness that takes the organized form of a party" many of the comrades in the discussion, and Joe at other points in his presentation, tend to talk as if this abstracted general consciousness is enough in itself. This is certainly the implication of Stevens' approach when he cites socialist consciousness as one of the criteria for a workers state and then characterizes Cuba as such a state.

Cliff Slaughter in his excellent article, "What Is Revolutionary Leadership?" (October-November, 1960 Labour Review) puts it this way: "There is no repository for this consciousness, and no guarantee of its necessary constant development in theory and in practise, other than the proletarian party. To talk about the working class 'itself' as an undifferentiated potentially revolutionary whole is to substitute myth for reality." Comrades who wish to have a richer understanding of this whole concept of consciousness and of the revolutionary party must read this fine article which gives, in my opinion, the Leninist view of the party underlying this whole article.

It is interesting to note, by the way, how popular this concept of floating unorganized consciousness is these days. It dominates much of the theorizing of the Pabloites; it is central to Sweezy's and Huberman's thought; our SLL comrades have had to counter it in the syndicalist "economist" deviations of Brian Behan. Interestingly Blas Roca resorts to this type of reasoning in his report to the PSP convention in Cuba last summer. He is presented with a problem not too dissimilar to the one which would face Hansen if the SWP were transplanted on Cuban soil: since the Stalinists support everything Castro does and offer in no way any alternative leadership to Castro why is it necessary to maintain an independent existence at all? In the section of his speech on the party Roca refers to "the backwardness of revolutionary consciousness" in the Cuban revolution and the need to engage in "the work of raising the revolutionary Marxist-Leninist consciousness of our members and all revolutionary elements." (The Cuban Revolution by Blas Roca, New Century, 1961.) Raised as it is in the abstract, it is quite clear that it is mere window dressing and that the PSP is in no way raising anybody's consciousness about anything. It even declares it is not interested in recruiting new members!

### On the Conversion of Castro

It is quite clear from the line taken by our press, from the Hansen "Theses," and from the discussion at the plenum, that the orientation of the party is one towards the Castro leadership of the Cuban revolution. The party is banking on the conversion of Castro as the hope for the further healthy development of the Cuban revolution (sometimes one even wonders if some comrades feel Castro needs any converting).

It is quite easy for a discussion of this question to get off the track right at the beginning by posing the differences as if they were: one side favors winning over Castro to the Fourth International while the other side adamantly opposes winning him over. This, of course, is a false counterposition, for who could possibly oppose winning anybody over -- even good old Jack Kennedy (especially with his millions included)?

In reality the majority and minority differ fundamentally in their assessment of the nature of the leadership of the Cuban revolution and on what our relationship should be to this leadership in the process of creating the revolutionary party. To some extent we do not even see the same reality in Cuba. To us, as Trotskyists, we must begin our analysis of the Cuban revolution with a recognition that there exists in Cuba a governmental apparatus separate from and, in part, having interests different from the working class and peasantry of Cuba. It is on this apparatus that Castro directly rests -- not on any organized party. While the Pabloites have a political line on Cuba which in other respects parallels the party majority's, they at least share with the minority a recognition of this reality. In fact, it is impossible for them to avoid recognizing this reality as they have a group in Cuba. The comrades of the IC in Latin America likewise recognize this reality but they, as distinct from the Pabloites, make this reality the central point of their whole approach to Cuba.

Theodore Draper<sup>(1)</sup> points out that Castro has allowed the 26th of July Movement to virtually disappear as a functioning entity. This point is also supported by observers less biased against the revolution, such as Simone de Beauvoir and Huberman-Sweezy. Even some of our own comrades who were down there have mentioned the lack of an organized party existence of the 26th of July Movement. Thus any orientation towards the Castro leadership cannot be directed towards the Castro party for no party really exists -- it must be directed towards the regime itself. Draper also notes that Castro's cabinet is composed entirely of middle-class elements. He further states: "Not a single one represents in any conceivable sense the peasantry or proletariat, or owes his position to its organized strength or pressure." This view again is supported by others more friendly to the regime as well as by our Trotskyist comrades in Latin America.

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(1) It is sad to see the anti-Marxist Draper so effectively destroy with Marxist methodology the arguments of the purported Marxists Huberman and Sweezy and to do so in the interests of imperialism. What makes it even sadder is that so many of our comrades are so enamored with Huberman and Sweezy. For instance, Draper notes Castro's Electrical Workers speech in which he urged the workers to take political power. He then queries as to why it was necessary for Castro to urge the workers to take power if Cuba was already a workers state? The majority comrades could do well to think that one over. Interested comrades should read this latest Draper article which can be found in the March Encounter or the March 21 New Leader under the title "Castro's Cuba -- A Revolution Betrayed?"

Harry Ring therefore makes an error when he advocates taking a "Pabloite line" in Cuba, thus meaning a deep-entry line within the 26th of July Movement. The reality of Cuba does not allow for this even if it were desirable. To orient towards Castro in the Cuba of today means to orient towards the governmental apparatus. It is quite clear that the Militant has all along had this orientation, presenting to its readers an uncritical apologia for everything the government does.

Our attitude is different. We favor the construction of a Trotskyist group in Cuba which is independent of the governmental apparatus and which represents the interests of the Cuban workers and peasants even when these interests run counter to the governmental apparatus. This means such a party would push for real workers and peasants control over the governmental apparatus. The lack of this control is in itself a sign of the fact that the apparatus represents separate interests from the working class and peasantry at least in part.

Bert Deck characterizes our position this way: "We have the proposal of Tim, for example, that the party should be built by saying to the Cuban workers, 'Break with Castro, build your own party!' . . . That proposal will be interpreted, rightly or wrongly, by the Cuban working class as a counterrevolutionary proposal." We need not go into what a damning admission this statement is both as to the nature of the regime in Cuba as well as to the extent of the adaptation of some comrades to the Castro leadership. But I do feel we should make two things clear about the way Comrade Deck puts our view. Firstly, tactically this is not what we would say to the Cuban workers now, for we would approach these workers with an understanding of their present level of consciousness and the distance these workers must travel politically before they are ready for such a proposition. Secondly, while this is not tactically what we would say in Cuba today, this is certainly our long-range strategic orientation. The Trotskyist party must be built in Cuba independently of the Castro apparatus though supporting Castro in every progressive step he takes. Its main field of work would be in the mass organizations of its class -- the workers militias, the unions, etc., as well as among the peasant organizations and cooperatives. It would urge the workers and peasants: "Do not rely on the governmental apparatus you do not control. You can count on only yourselves. Insist that you be given a direct voice in the government through representatives of your own choosing." This is the approach of our Latin-American comrades. This is our approach. This is the Trotskyist approach.

Does this mean we have no approach towards Castro, towards others who support him in and out of the apparatus? Of course we do. After all, as one comrade remarked, Marx, Engels and Lenin were once petty-bourgeois nationalists (as was Trotsky for that matter). But our orientation is different from that of the majority. Comrade Hansen spells out quite accurately the party's approach this way (and in doing so brings out a strain in party thinking which was also harmfully present during regroupment) -- he says we must "get closer to them. Be friendly with them. . . ."



This is what the Militant has been doing for months. If compliments were enough to win over centrists we would have won over not only Castro to our party by this time but John Gates and Howard Fast long before him. Unfortunately it is not enough; centrists can be won over only if we criticize their weaknesses. Otherwise we are giving them no real reason to change in the first place. If it is possible to win Castro or some of his key supporters to our movement it will be the result of an attempt to present to them Trotskyism as an alternative to what they already have as part of the process of building an independent movement in Cuba.

Our resolution, "Against Pabloite Revisionism," passed by the 25th Anniversary Plenum, states: "The function of a revolutionary policy is to organize, mobilize and help lead the masses in their struggles, not to look for and even less to bank upon any break in the bureaucracy." While this was written about the Pabloites' approach to the Stalinist bureaucracy, its essential approach is just as applicable to the Castro regime or for that matter to the centrist leadership of a political party or a union. We do not bank on "any breaks" within the centrist leadership though should such breaks occur we would seek to take advantage of them. However, under no circumstances do we orient our whole policy towards possible favorable developments in the top leadership. The Trotskyists at all times and under all circumstances rely on the working class itself and its most advanced militants. We attempt to teach the workers to feel their own strength -- to act independently and not expect petty-bourgeois leaderships to do the job for them. Let us seize every opportunity that opens up in the petty-bourgeois leadership, win over to our banner every possible person -- but let's not rely on alien class forces to do the job for us under the pressure of the masses.

Even if Castro were to be won over to Trotskyism that would not solve the problems of the Cuban revolution. A single individual, no matter how noble or how brilliant, is no substitute for a political cadre. The SLL Resolution on International Perspectives warns against those who rely so much on "faith in a leader." It notes that this "puts what has so far been achieved at the mercy of an assassin's bullet." All those who emphasize the overriding importance of Castro to the Cuban revolution and all the positive achievements of his leadership of this revolution -- as for example his insistence on a really radical agrarian reform -- point up all the more sharply the real need in Cuba for supplementing, if you will, the leader with an organized conscious cadre. The real test of Castro's leadership capabilities therefore will be judged historically not so much on his own personal wisdom or his deep understanding of the moods of the masses. The real test will be Castro's ability to build a conscious revolutionary cadre linked with the masses and directly controlled by them. He, so far, has not passed this test very well, and we have in no way helped him in this by clearly pointing out this road to him.

### The Automation of Party Building

Another idea which was very dominant among the comrades at the plenum was the concept of the creation of the mass Marxist party

during the course of the revolution itself. Comrade Hansen puts it this way in his original presentation: "How are we going to build such a party? Will it be built in advance of the revolution? It would be good if it could be -- at least that's what the Cubans themselves say now -- it would be good to have such a party in advance. The fact is that such a party has got to be built in the very process of revolution as revolutions occur with varying degrees of success." Murry Weiss and other comrades said much the same thing during the floor discussion.

Because of the extreme weakness of our movement on the world-wide scale we will be faced with many situations where the objective development of the revolution proceeds faster than the growth of the subjective factor -- the vanguard party. This means that we will be faced with situations, such as Cuba, where there is a tremendous revolutionary potential crying out for the creation of a mass Marxist party but where there has been no historically created Trotskyist cadre of any size.

Under such conditions we must of course utilize the impulsion that revolutionary events give to politics and attempt to create the vanguard party during the actual process of revolution. However, we should not be overly optimistic about our abilities to create parties on such short notice. More than likely, if we are lucky, we will be able to create a cadre capable, not of leading the revolution, but at least of learning from the mistakes caused by the lack of revolutionary leadership so that it can prepare for the next revolutionary wave.

The danger in the conception of Comrade Hansen is that it can lead comrades to the Pabloite approach that the masses automatically create their own leaderships or transform the traditional leaderships under the pressure of the masses. If this is true then it is a waste of time to try to create revolutionary parties ahead of time.

For instance, Comrade DeBruce states: "It happens to be a historic fact that the working class throughout the world have adopted the vehicle and the leadership which it may need at a given stage. You may disagree with it, you may not like it, you can recognize its limitations -- still, they accomplish the given task." If this were only true we surely could save ourselves and the workers of other lands a lot of sweat and energy building particular orthodox Trotskyist parties, for any old party that happens to be around will do. But it is not "a historic fact" as attested by the long history of terrible betrayals of the social democracy and of the Stalinists -- without which there would be no capitalism today. The essence of Trotskyism is to prove that this isn't true. But it is Comrade Joe who is really to blame for creating a political environment in the party which nurtures such views in otherwise excellent comrades.

### Export of Sugar and Revolution

We noted at the beginning of this article our complete agreement with Comrade Hansen on the importance of the world revolutionary party. The question of the creation of a party in Cuba, like-

wise, must be related to the creation of revolutionary parties throughout Latin America. We view the Cuban revolution from the viewpoint of what it can contribute to the building of the revolutionary Marxist party in Latin America. The building of this party is in the self-interest of the Cuban people, we feel, for if the Cuban revolution is left in isolation it is bound to degenerate.

The SLL Resolution on International Perspectives sums up our view this way: "It is of paramount importance to defend the Cuban Revolution -- but at the same time to call for its extension, both in depth through setting up of a regime based upon workers' and peasants' councils and geographically by taking up the same issues in other parts of Latin America, and particularly in the Central American states which have similar problems and are openly dominated by the big American monopolies."

To what extent has Castro been carrying out a program of exporting the revolution? Shane Mage in his presentation to the New York Local discussion on Cuba pointed out the contradiction faced by the Cuban regime between the need to normalize trade and other relations with the capitalist countries of the Western Hemisphere (that is the diplomatic needs of the Cuban government) on the one hand, and the need to spread the revolution through precisely overthrowing these regimes on the other hand. This is the same contradiction which faced the Bolsheviks in the early days when, on the one hand, they established diplomatic relations with the Weimar Republic and, on the other hand, they supported its overthrow. The Bolsheviks solved, at least partly, this contradiction by making a clear distinction between the Soviet government and its diplomatic needs and the Communist International and its revolutionary needs. Lenin and Trotsky realized that they played two roles -- as heads of a state which needed to come at least temporarily to terms with the capitalist West and as heads of a world party which needed to overthrow this very same capitalism. Stalin later broke down this distinction and subordinated the CI to the diplomatic maneuvers of the government.

Castro faces much the same problem. We do not deny the necessity for the Castro regime to seek to get capitalist countries in Latin America to normalize relations with it. This it must do to survive and it must survive. Everything Castro does in this direction is quite necessary and in keeping with his role as leader of a state.

But Castro also should be the leader of a revolutionary movement. We can and must insist that he play a role as such a leader and that the policies of such a revolutionary movement be independent of the diplomatic needs of the Cuban government if he seeks to be a real revolutionist. However, as we have noted earlier, Castro does not even have a real party of his own in Cuba so he is not in a very good position, even if he wished to, to play a leading role in the creation of a revolutionary movement in Latin America which could spread the revolution and thus help save the Cuban revolution.

Neither seeing clearly the need for making such a division between government and revolutionary movement nor having an organization which would make this possible, Castro plays a very ambiva-

lent role in relation to the Latin-American revolution. At times he ardently calls for the spread of revolution, at other times he seems to pull back from this and solidarizes himself with such bourgeois leaders as President Quadros of Brazil. A New York Times dispatch of February 14 clearly expresses this ambiguity: "Asked if he considered that his speech last Saturday night threatening to export the Cuban Revolution to the rest of Latin America violated the principle of non-intervention, of which he accuses the United States, Dr. Castro conceded, 'that's true.'"

"I may have been carried away, which sometimes happens in these speeches,' he added."

This lack of building a revolutionary party in Cuba capable of taking a lead in the spread of revolution throughout Latin America is perhaps Castro's greatest weakness as a revolutionary leader. It points up so clearly the real need for a revolutionary Marxist party in Cuba and how harmful is the majority's lack of a program for building such a party.

### The Latin-American Conference

The recently held Latin-American Conference for National Sovereignty, Economic Emancipation and Peace brings out these issues all the clearer. This conference was called by elements close to the Stalinists and associated with the World Peace Council. Joe Hansen points out that the organizational work of the conference was done by the Stalinists. It was, however, in attendance, far broader than the Stalinists. It included well-known Latin-American liberal bourgeois elements such as Cardenas; Fidelista-type groupings; some social democratic and centrist groupings; as well as the Stalinists and their close allies. This meant that the participation of our movement in the conference could have been quite effective if based on a solid Trotskyist line.

The line of the conference was that of the all-class fight against imperialism -- that is the Stalinist line of a national front of the liberal bourgeoisie with the working-class forces. This was symbolized in the leading dignitary of the conference, Cardenas, whom Comrade Hansen identifies correctly in the Militant as a "left bourgeois radical." But more importantly this line was actually spelled out by the decisions of the conference. The National Guardian (March 27) reprints the basic declaration of the conference which limits the struggle to bourgeois democratic demands. It states: "Without economic emancipation there is no political sovereignty. In order to attain it we need: total agrarian reform with special attention to the Indian population; recovery of the national resources which today are in the power of foreign monopolies; access to the basic resources of energy and the fundamental industries and free access to all the markets; technical and economic assistance without damaging conditions." Note the absence of any demands directed against the liberal bourgeoisie or which are openly socialist. It also calls for "the strict cooperation and solidarity among the democratic forces of each country and among all Latin-American countries. . . ." In other words rather than putting forward class demands and class struggle this conference calls for a multi-class front against imperialism.

Comrade Hansen, rather than attacking this class-collaborationist line in Latin America, solidarizes himself with it, referring to the conference in the Militant as "this first parliament of 200,000,000 people" and as "a united front against U.S. imperialism and in defense of the Cuban Revolution." What happened to our conception of a workers united front as contrasted to the Stalinist conception of a multi-class popular front or anti-imperialist front?

At this conference the Cubans played, Hansen notes, a subordinate role as is proper for a governmental delegation, while the appeal of the Cuban revolution dominated the conference. The Cubans should have been represented at the conference, not as a governmental delegation, but as a revolutionary party fighting for leadership of the Latin-American revolution. Instead, the Cuban revolution was eulogized by all speakers but the line which dominated the conference was the Stalinist one of a coalition with the liberal bourgeoisie -- an idea which the Cubans themselves were forced to break with to bring Cuba even as far along as it is today. Thus the political line of the Cuban revolution was in reality defeated at this conference though Cuba was smothered in garlands of roses. Castro displayed at this conference his inability to organize the Latin-American revolution which raises the danger of Stalinist domination of the Latin-American revolutionary movement.

The coverage of this conference in our press, Joe's speech on it in New York, and other talks and articles dealing with the Latin-American revolution contain within them certain other points which we should take note of. First, we note time and time again a certain abstract use of the word "revolution." The comrades are impressed because Cardenas favors "revolution," that all other delegates at the conference support "revolution," that Castro is for exporting "revolution" (at times), etc. What the comrades fail to note is that there are different sorts of revolution. There are bourgeois revolutions and there are socialist revolutions. Everyone in Latin America who is at least a liberal favors some sort of "revolution" some place -- even if he only means overthrowing the dictatorships like those in Paraguay and the Dominican Republic. President Mateos of Mexico himself came out for "revolution" and even muttered about the socialist revolution. To favor "revolution" is not enough in Latin America. One must ask what kind of revolution one favors and how one intends to achieve it. We favor a socialist revolution in Latin America and we feel it can only be achieved through the independent struggles of the working class led by a Marxist vanguard party -- that is the orthodox Trotskyist party.

Another theme directly related to the above is a certain tendency of our comrades to get panicky about the imminent revolution in Latin America. Some comrades get swept away with the impressionistic hysteria that dominates so much of the Pabloite writings on this subject. If the socialist revolution is so close at hand in Latin America we should not waste our time with the small Trotskyist groupings already in existence there, the reasoning goes. Let's "get closer to" these new Fidelista groupings, etc., in the hope that they will prove adequate -- "You can recognize its limitations -- still, they accomplish the given task."

We have a different attitude. We feel that the tempo will not be quite as intense as some comrades feel it will be. We do not underestimate the stability of imperialism -- we do not underestimate our enemy. Rather than impressionistical by-passing the historically created cadres of Trotskyism in Latin America we orient towards these cadres. We say that the vanguard will be built in Latin America first through the salvaging of the best which our movement has created in Latin America. With these forces our movement then can move intelligently to help small forces grow through proper flexible intervention into the mass movements in Latin America.

### What About Pabloism?

Harry Ring calls for the "Pabloite line" in Cuba with the same "enthusiasm" that he greeted regroupment and with the same "intoxication" he greeted Cuba. Comrade Roberts notes: "If it so happens that some of the conclusions we reach coincide with Pablo's so be it." He then adds enigmatically: "We'll have to draw, perhaps, some further political conclusions from that."

Both comrades seem to be trying to make the same point: Pablo may be right here or he may be wrong there. We, in any case, will work out our own views and should some of them coincide with Pablo's "so be it." What these comrades fail to recognize is that Pabloism is a worked out consistent world view in which every single question is related to every other one. It is counterposed to the world view of orthodox Trotskyism which has recently been summed up quite well by the SLL. These two views are mutually contradictory and each one consistent within itself. The SWP appears to be stumbling along somewhere in between, embracing Pabloism on Cuba and related questions, partially fighting it on China. It is producing an empirical patchwork quilt political outlook and has in reality no overall view of the world -- no strategy of world revolution as Trotsky used to call it. It therefore really has no method and no guarantee that when the next question comes up it will empirically work out a correct point of view rather than an incorrect one. Such an approach tends to leave a party rudderless and fosters an opportunistic view of political theory in which theory becomes a tool for the organizational growth of the party rather than the organizational growth of the party being an expression of the central world theoretical view.

I urge the comrades to read the resolutions of the recently concluded Sixth World Congress of the Pabloites published in the Winter issue of the Fourth International. Then read the SLL's Resolution on International Perspectives. I feel the counterposed views will then be quite obvious and the place of Cuba and our discussion of Cuba within these two world outlooks also will be clear.

The Pabloites are essentially impressionists and therefore they emphasize only the objective flow of revolution. The revolutionary party is viewed as being created by the mass upsurges almost automatically. The role of Trotskyists is to "win positions and influence inside the mass movement"; to "aid strengthening of left tendencies, especially those basing themselves on the trade unions"; to act "as the guide in the process whereby the new leadership

matures and emerges"; to give "the most conscious impulse for the emergence and organization of this future leadership." Never the long arduous task of creating the vanguard party itself. Always "strengthening," "guiding," "pushing" someone else. When it comes to working within the mass movements never consciously creating a vanguard organization within these movements -- rather win "influence," "positions." Get in on top and wait for the masses to push you, too, to power.

It is sad to say but I cannot find a clearer example of this Pabloite view of the role of the party than in Murry Weiss' article "Trotskyism Today" which appeared in the Fall, 1960, International Socialist Review. Comrade Weiss states: "Trotskyists have never claimed a franchise on revolutionary theory and practice. On the contrary, all of our work is directed toward convincing the working class and its parties to take the revolutionary road." Of course we do not claim to have a franchise on all revolutionary theory and practice -- we only claim the "franchise" on correct revolutionary theory and practice. All our work is directed toward -- should be directed toward -- convincing the workers over the long run to make us "its party" and unless this is done it cannot "take the revolutionary road" -- the road to power.

This essential concept of the revolutionary party worked out consistently by Pablo and expressed in this article of Murry's is inherent in the view of the party majority on Cuba. However, the comrades have not related it consistently to a whole world view. To this extent the majority's empiricism saves it from a far more dangerous course. But one cannot go for long developing gerry-built theories to meet new political events (those which "force" us to have theories). The party will have to decide which view of the world it believes in. This is what the present party discussion and the discussion in the world movement is all about.

April 7, 1961.

## STALINISM AND THE CUBAN REVOLUTION

By Martha Curti

In the opening presentation of the Cuba discussion in the New York branch, Comrade Hansen said that in the course of the discussion now unfolding it would be necessary for the party to reassess its whole attitude toward China, Yugoslavia, Eastern Europe, and the Soviet Union itself. Let us hope that this reassessment will lead to a reaffirmation of the present position of the SWP as put forth in the 1953 plenum resolution, "Against Pabloist Revisionism" (Discussion Bulletin, A-12, November, 1953); the 1955 resolution on China; and other documents.

In recent years the party has tended to treat the international role of Stalinism in a one-sided, simplistic manner; it tends to emphasize in the press only the positive, revolutionary role of Stalinism as an ally of the colonial revolution, but underestimates or ignores altogether its counterrevolutionary role in seeking to contain the colonial revolution within a capitalist framework, as part of the "peaceful coexistence" policy of the bureaucracy.

While the party says that the Soviet Union is a contradictory phenomenon, the major contradiction being that between the conservative ruling bureaucracy and the nationalized property, in practice the party press ignores one side of the contradiction. Currently this approach is shown in the treatment of Cuba and Laos. While correctly approving of the aid to the Cuban revolution given by the Soviet lands, the Militant has carried not one word of warning of the dangers inherent in such aid. That will be dealt with later in this article. On Laos, the Militant emphasizes as the sole danger to the Laotian people the possibility of American military intervention, while totally ignoring the alternative which is probably more likely: that the progressive forces in Laos will be the object of manipulation by the Kremlin for a Geneva-type summit meeting.

This tendency is by no means a consistent one. There have been some important exceptions, such as Tibet and Kerala, where the Militant has erred in quite the other direction.

But if the tendency to minimize the counterrevolutionary aspects of the Soviet role were followed through logically and consistently, it would lead to the adoption by the party of the Pabloite view which "Against Pabloist Revisionism" is arguing against.

### The Kremlin as an Ally of the Cuban Revolution

There is a parallel between our defense of the Soviet Union and our defense of the Cuban revolution. When we say we are for the unconditional defense of the Soviet Union against imperialist attack but at the same time we are for a political revolution to replace the bureaucracy with workers democracy, we are attacked by Stalinists and their sympathizers for being "anti-Soviet." But we, the Trotskyists, are the best defenders of the Soviet Union; for without a critical analysis of the Soviet Union, without an under-



standing of its problems, without warning clearly about the dangers before it, a defense of the conquests of October is impossible. Similarly with Cuba. To assure the Cubans that all is fine and dandy, that a rosy future is before them, is to pave the way for the defeat of the revolution. Warning them of the dangers confronting them, clearly stating what conditions are necessary for the development of the Cuban revolution into a healthy workers state moving towards socialism, are essential to the very survival and healthy development of the revolution! And we Trotskyists are the only ones who can do this for the Cuban revolution. No one else will.

What is the traditional Trotskyist view of the international role of Stalinism? Two quotations should suffice to remind the comrades:

"Stalinism was formed in a backward and isolated situation. Its social base is the petty-bourgeois bureaucratic caste. Due to the specific privileges of this caste, its ideology is conservative, compromising and opportunistic in nature. . . . The highest expression of its opportunism is the theory of 'socialism in one country' from which is derived the line of 'peaceful coexistence' between socialism and capitalism as a replacement of the strategy of world revolution." -- S.T.Peng, "On the Nature of the Chinese Communist Party and Its Regime," SWP Discussion Bulletin, Vol. 22, No. 4, March, 1961, p. 4.

"The bureaucracy hates and fears the world revolution and strives to head it off, restrict, control, subvert and strangle it . . . . So long as the Kremlin can use this or that sector of the colonial movement for its own ends, it will do so. But it remains a very perfidious ally in the best circumstances." -- "Against Pabloist Revisionism," pp. 9-10.

In Cuba, this would mean that the Kremlin is seeking to contain the Cuban revolution within a capitalist framework; that the bureaucracy would like to arrive at an agreement with the imperialist countries whereby the latter promise no aggression against Cuba while Cuba, in turn, promises not to export the revolution. In the eyes of the bureaucracy, the present and preordained stage which Cuba must (for some length of time) pass through is that of the bourgeois national democratic revolution. This is, in fact, the case for the whole Latin-American revolution and the entire colonial revolution; the main task for the CPs in the colonial countries, therefore, is to implement this policy of keeping the colonial revolution within capitalist limits.

Such would be the application of the accepted Trotskyist analysis of Stalinism to the Cuban revolution. This contrasts, in many important respects, with statements in the majority "Theses" and remarks made by majority comrades in the discussion.

#### Can the CPs Still Sell Out the Colonial Revolution?

"So there's a new world reality that we are dealing with today. And that world reality is the 1917 Revolution plus the war

and what resulted from it. Namely, the revolutions in Yugoslavia, in China, in the Eastern European countries; the growth in power of the Soviet Union -- it's no longer an isolated workers state fighting for its life; it's a powerful state, the second greatest power in the world. And by the force of circumstance -- not the least of which is the Chinese revolution -- the Soviet Union is compelled today, instead of playing a counterrevolutionary role -- it's compelled, out of self-defense of interest, say what you may, to place itself on the side of revolution." -- M. Stein, SWP Discussion Bulletin, Vol. 22, No. 2, p. 21.

"Stalinism can no longer, even with all of its great power, completely disorient these immature developments and these weak parties. On the contrary, it is losing power over them. And there's the great profound change that's taking place in the world." -- Murry Weiss, Ibid., p. 29.

In the view of these comrades, the great powerful upsurge of the colonial revolution sweeps aside the obstacles created by Stalinism; indeed the pressure of the revolutionary masses forces the Kremlin to support the revolution.

There is, of course, some truth in the remarks of Comrades Stein and Weiss. Stalinism on a world scale has not gone unscathed through the serious internal crisis following the 20th party congress, the Hungarian revolution, and its predecessors the Vorkuta strike and the East German events. Nor have the Yugoslav and Chinese revolutions failed to have far-reaching repercussions. Stalinism has indeed been weakened by these events. Does this mean, however, that the fundamental character of Stalinism -- its role of sacrificing the interests of the proletarian revolution in all countries to the demands of peaceful coexistence -- has changed?

Comrade Stein invokes the "new world reality" to support his contention. But he does not cite any new reality which has not already been taken care of in the 1953 resolution. The arguments which the Pabloites cited for this proposition -- the expansion of Stalinism, the end of the isolation of the workers states, the strengthening of their economy, conflicts within the bureaucracy, and the Chinese revolution -- are all accounted for in the 1953 SWP resolution. Therefore if anything in the "new world reality" warrants changing our basic analysis it must be something that has happened since 1953.

If the view were true, that Stalinism is no longer able to sell out the colonial revolution, then one should be able to discern a change in the role of the CPs in the colonial countries since 1953. However, there has been not one case where the CP has failed to play its historic role. Certainly not in Algeria; not in Indonesia; not in Africa; not in Iraq. Then where?

In Iraq, for example, in the summer of 1958, the people were armed; and were, outside of the army, the only real power. The CP, as the only party with any mass base, was in a position to lead the masses to power. Instead, it favored disarming the militias and supported the national bourgeois regime of Kassem, thus guaran-

teeing the safe future of Iraq within the capitalist orbit.

Does the Chinese revolution make a revision of our analysis necessary? Comrade Murry Weiss, in his article "Trotskyism Today" (ISR, Fall, 1960) states: "The Chinese Communist party did not act according to Stalinist theory and practice when it led the revolution to power." In order to lead socialist revolutions the CCP had to "tear loose from" its "Stalinist moorings."

But China -- the regime and the CCP -- are no less Stalinist than they ever were. Comrade Peng proves this conclusively. The comrades who see China as somehow approaching Leninism make the mistake of taking momentary turns -- temporary relaxations of repression, concessions to the masses, toleration and even encouragement of revolutions -- as somehow permanent departures from Stalinism. They are just as Stalinist as their opposite, occurring consistently within the framework of socialism in one country. (See Peng, op. cit., and Shane Mage's article in Summer, 1960, Young Socialist.)

Then Comrade Murry's hopes for the Chinese role in Cuba are not justified: "In Cuba, the position of Peking can play a crucial role in preventing Stalinism from interposing its influence in order to halt the deepening of the socialist character of the revolution." (ISR, op. cit.)

(Just as these lines are being written, the New York Times reports that China has expressed agreement with the Soviet approach towards "solving" the Laos crisis.)

Therefore, despite the new upsurges in the colonial world, despite the advances made by the Chinese revolution and the Soviet economy, despite the internal crises in the Communist parties, our fundamental analysis of Stalinism remains the same. There is no reason to believe, merely because the coming of Castro to power took the PSP (Cuban CP) by surprise, that the Kremlin will act any differently than it has in the past. The Kremlin is aiming to make a deal with the West using Cuba as a pawn. Can this have no ill effects?

"It is true that world conditions militate against the Kremlin's consummation of any lasting deals with imperialism or its bargains with the national bourgeoisie. But the objective consequences of its attempts to maintain the status quo or arrive at such agreements have much more than 'limited and ephemeral' practical effects. Its maneuvers help block the advance of the revolutionary movement and adversely affect the world relationship of forces." -- "Against Pabloist Revisionism," p. 10.

This is still true. Yet Harry Ring regarded with absolute horror the mild statement of this ABC in the January Young Socialist (see Discussion Bulletin, Vol. 22, No. 2, p. 19). It almost seemed as if he considered it an insult to the Cuban people to suggest that Kennedy and Khrushchev might try to make a deal over Cuba. But all the fine intentions of the Cubans, their revolutionary dedication, their fierce determination to defend their revolu-

tion, can't withstand the peaceful coexistence pressures or prevent the Kremlin from carrying them out. Only a conscious understanding by the leadership of the Cuban revolution of the contradictory nature of Stalinism can possibly prevent this. Surely it is no insult to the Cubans, no deprecation of their remarkable accomplishments, to warn them, to tell them what we, who after all have as a movement devoted quite some thought and attention to the question, expect from the Stalinists? It is indeed our duty. Yet no such warnings have been forthcoming.

### The Question of Soviet Aid

Cuba, in spite of its rich natural resources, is a backward country and has been kept that way by the domination of U.S. imperialism. It is more backward than the Russia of 1917, having no real heavy industry of consequence. Obviously the Cuban economy cannot exist in isolation from more advanced economies; it must be integrated either with imperialist or Soviet economies.

The Cuban-Soviet trade agreement has enabled the Cuban revolution to survive -- but that is all. It is unlikely that the USSR could or would provide sufficient wherewithal for Cuba to industrialize. In any case, however, wouldn't it be rather naive to assert that the Soviet aid comes without a price, without pressures being exerted? True, the Soviet Union is a workers state, having a planned economy; it has no inherent need, as contrasted with imperialism, to extend its economic domination over other countries. But it is a degenerated workers state; and what aid it gives to backward countries can serve not to aid the proletarian revolution in those countries but to implement the foreign policy of the bureaucracy -- coexistence. What Comrade Peng says about Soviet aid to China is equally applicable to Cuba:

"They [Swabeck and Liang] forget that despite the 'now well advanced resources' Russia has today, it is still a degenerated workers state under a Stalinist bureaucratic dictatorship. Its 'military and economic' assistance to China can, of course, help the latter to resist the invasion of imperialism (as in the Korean War) and build a socialist-type industry; but on the other hand, by bringing the CCP under its control and making it more dependent, the Kremlin bureaucracy facilitates the growth of the Chinese 'Stalinist bureaucracy and its crystallization into a privileged caste.'" -- S.T.Peng, op. cit., p. 9.

### The Cuban Communist Party

The majority "Theses on the Cuban Revolution" express quite a dangerous attitude toward the PSP:

"The fact is that the Cuban Communist party supports the revolution. If a rift were to occur between Cuba and the Soviet Union, it can be taken for certain that the loyalties of a decisive section of the Communist party, if not the party as a whole, would remain with the Cuban revolution. The experience in Yugoslavia speaks eloquently for such an outcome.

"With free access to the views of all radical currents, as is the case in Havana today, the Cuban Communist party can be expected to undergo considerable transformation, no matter what the ups and downs of the diplomatic relations may be." -- Draft Theses, paragraph 17.

Has such a thing ever happened? Does the experience in Yugoslavia "speak eloquently for such an outcome?" If a national CP takes an independent course from the Kremlin, it does not necessarily do so in the interests of the proletarian revolution. It can also break from the Kremlin in the direction of national Stalinism, as is the case with Yugoslavia. Of all the countries in the Soviet bloc, Yugoslavia is the farthest removed from socialism. Bourgeois influences are greater there than anywhere else. Is that what Comrade Hansen would like to see in Cuba?

In his summary speech to the plenum, Hansen accuses Comrade Wohlforth of ignoring the Cuban CP, of having no policy towards it. Our approach toward the Cuban CP is similar to that toward other CPs: as long as the CP exists as a tendency it poses a mortal threat to the working-class revolution. However, no opportunity should be spared to take advantage of any cleavages, crises, etc., in the Cuban CP; to move a section of it towards Leninism. It would be surprising indeed if the Cuban revolution did not create quite a ferment in the Cuban CP. But without an independent Trotskyist movement there, on the scene, how could we be sure that dissident Communists would move in the right direction? Perhaps some objective process will automatically endow them with a Leninist ideology?

In short, we disagree with Pablo's notion that "under mass pressure, the CPs can project a revolutionary orientation."

### The Pabloite View

The views of some members of the majority on these questions parallel the views of the Pabloites. They are expressed quite clearly in the objections of Comrade Nora Roberts to an article submitted to the YS by Tim Wohlforth, as summarized in the NEC minutes of March 27, 1961:

"This article is not about the Leninist concept of the vanguard party; it is rather a presentation of Tim's position on the world movement. That position is incorrect, that is, that the essential task of this period, as it has been, unchanged, for the past 20 years, is centered upon building the vanguard party in the advanced countries and that the colonial revolutions are somewhat to be sloughed off. I am in fundamental agreement on the necessity of the revolutionary party in advanced countries; but it is necessary to look toward new developments -- the breakup of Stalinism and primarily the new development in Cuba. Our prime task in this new situation is to make an approach to the Cuban revolution and its revolutionary leadership -- to make a bloc with the revolutionary leaderships in the colonial countries for the purpose of winning them over."

This view of the world situation, emphasizing the importance of the onrushing colonial revolution and the almost automatic disintegration of Stalinism, minimizes the essential and primary role of the struggle in the advanced capitalist countries. These are the views put forward by Pablo.

The SWP, fortunately, has not adopted a consistent Pabloite outlook. On the China question, for example, it has taken a more or less correct view of opposition to the views of Swabeck and Liang.

The Pabloites contended in 1953 that the "fundamental conditions under which the Soviet bureaucracy and its tight hold over the Communist Parties developed, namely, the ebb of the revolution, the isolation of the Soviet Union and the backward condition of its economy -- these conditions have disappeared." Their view is that inherent in the expansion of the workers states is their disintegration: "The 'expansion' of Stalinism contained within it tendencies acting toward its own disintegration, which have been demonstrated by: the break-away of the JCP (Yugoslav CP); the numerous purges of the CP leaderships in the 'people's democracies'; the acceptance of a sort of co-leadership with the Chinese CP in regard to the Asian Communist movements; the weakening of certain Communist parties, to the verge of their virtual liquidation; the end of political immobility within the Soviet Union; and the beginning of the revolutionary upsurge in the glaxis." -- "Rise and Decline of Stalinism," resolution of the 4th World Congress of the Fourth International, reprinted in the Fourth International, No. 1, Winter, 1958, p. 34.

This concept about the disintegration of Stalinism being inherent in its very expansion appears to be nice and dialectical. It is also very comforting. But is it accurate?

Dialectical as it may appear, the concept fails to take into account the fact that just as the bureaucracy itself embodies a contradiction, so its expansion is not a one-sided affair. The Pabloites present the case for the weakened position of Stalinism as a result of its expansion: they ignore almost totally the fact that this expansion has also been a source of strength to the bureaucracy.

All the arguments of the Pabloite resolution of 1953 are thoroughly demolished in the SWP plenum resolution of that year, and it is unnecessary to repeat them here. But have the Pabloites moved away from these positions since -- have they come closer to our views? Putting aside the fact that at the moment it is not clear what our views are, since we are engaged in discussing them, the Pabloites have become more revisionist since.

Throughout the documents of their 6th World Congress (Winter 1960-61 FI) they glorify the colonial revolution and deemphasize the advanced countries. This is clearly stated on page 34: ". . . the colonial revolution occupies the vanguard place in the world revolution and operates as its main force." The revolutionary leaderships of the colonial countries are the "new mass revolution-

ary movements" which are the Pabloite short cuts for the more arduous building of the Marxist vanguard in the colonial countries. The resolution on "The Crisis of Stalinism" refers almost sneeringly to the small Trotskyist parties: "Thus for the first time the Communists of the entire world. . . /are/ challenged -- no longer by small vanguard groups of a predominantly ideological nature, but by mass revolutionary movements which are spearheads in the struggle against the capitalist world." (p. 51.) "Colonial work still remains the main field of work." (p. 15.) (That's because the Pabloites haven't been able to build movements in the advanced countries.)

In the Pabloite view, the Kremlin bureaucracy is an ally -- a bona fide ally -- of the colonial revolution. The "growing alliance (of the colonial revolution) with the workers states," the "de facto alliance of the workers states with the colonial revolution," and the like are sprinkled generously throughout all the resolutions. The Chinese CP is deepening its ideological cleavage with Moscow and is, in fact, almost a Leninist party. "The Communist Party of China started to crystallize in the international field a 'left opposition' to the line of 'peaceful coexistence,' regarding relations both with world imperialism and with the colonial bourgeoisie." (p. 12.)

All these questions should become part of the international discussion now taking place. The SWP will have to decide whether it reaffirms its traditional positions or wishes to revise them in the direction of Pabloism.

April 10, 1961.